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Abstract
We study the emergence of communication in multiagent adversarial settings
inspired by the classic Imitation game. A class of three player games is used to
explore how agents based on sequence to sequence (Seq2Seq) models can learn to
communicate information in adversarial settings. We propose a modeling approach,
an initial set of experiments and use signaling theory to support our analysis. In
addition, we describe how we operationalize the learning process of actor-critic
Seq2Seq based agents in these communicational games.
1 Introduction
We propose an initial step towards models to study the emergence of communication in adversarial
environments. In particular, we explore Seq2Seq [18][5][21] based agents in a class of games inspired
by the Imitation game [20].
We analyze these games from the perspective of signaling games [17][23]. Agents are required to learn
how to maximize their expected reward by improving their communication policies. Experiments do
not assume previous knowledge or training and all agents are a priori ungrounded, i.e. tabula rasa.
Training Seq2Seq models is known to be challenging [1][2][22][9]. In this work, we use an actor-
critic architecture, however unlike Bahdanau et al.[2], our emphasis is not on sequence prediction but
on maximizing expected rewards by developing a adequate communicational strategy.
When analyzed from a signaling perspective, we show how agents in adversarial conditions may learn
to communicate and transfer information when intrinsic or environmental conditions are adequate:
e.g. handicap and computational advantages. Depending on the game structure, we show how agents
reach separating or pooling equilibria [17].
1.1 Game class description
We study a class of three-player imperfect information iterated games. Two agents, one of each type
c ∈ {blue, red} (i.e. Ablue and Ared), and a single interrogator agent (I) exchange messages m, i.e.
sequences m = s1s2· · ·sL of discrete symbols sl ∈ Σ from a prearranged alphabet Σ. This alphabet
includes a special symbol <EOS> to indicate the end of sentences. The lack of common knowledge
is a key distinction with respect to the classic Imitation game definition. Agents are not aware of their
own or others limitations. Like classic reinforcement learning, they need to explore and discover their
competitive advantages or disadvantages through interaction.
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In every iteration t, the interrogator I starts by sending a question/primer mQt to both Ac agents.
Afterwards, I receives their answers as two anonymous messages mAit and is rewarded if it can
determine the type ci of the source of each message. Blue and red are in adversarial positions.
While Ablue is rewarded when its messages are recognized, Ared is rewarded when it misleads I and
c = red messages are incorrectly identified as c = blue. After each iteration, all messages, sources,
rewards and I’s inferred types are made available to all agents. Agents use this information to update
their communication strategies and beliefs.
2 Related Work
Attention has been recently brought to the communicational aspects of multiagent systems. Recent
research has explored cooperative [6][14][9] and semi-cooperative scenarios such as negotiation
games [4]. The emergence of communication in adversarial scenarios has been explored less
extensively.
A variation of the classic Imitation game [20], the famous Turing test, has been considered for many
years a canonical proof of intelligent behavior. While the validity of this assertion is controversial
[16], the game definition is very valuable. There is a significant overlap with signaling theory [17]
and signaling games have been extensively explored in the economics and game theory literature.
While our motivation is to study the emergence of communication as a signaling mechanism, we
notice how Kannan et al.[11] use a related approach to evaluate model performance. In their work,
they propose a generative adversarial network (GAN) [7] where a discriminator had to differentiate
between real sentences and a generative model.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) [7] have resulted in a wide range of interesting adversarial
applications. However, the extension to sequence to sequence models (Seq2Seq) [18] has been
difficult. Combining GAN with Seq2Seq models is challenging because discrete samples drawn from
categorical distributions hinder backpropagation. In addition, alternatives on how to perform reward
imputation to partial sequences [1] have been proposed.
With respect to backpropagating errors, reparametrization [8] has been used multiple times to allow
for backpropagation through stochastic nodes. In particular, Gumbel-Softmax[13] has allowed
categorical distributions [10] in stochastic computational graphs. This technique has been shown as
an alternative to reinforcement learning [9] within the scope of cooperative referential games. More
recently, similar ideas resulted in SeqGAN [22] being proposed. Further incremental improvements
have been published, such as applying actor-critic models [2] or combining with proximal policy
optimization (PPO) [19] in order to improve learning performance.
3 Model
We use Seq2Seq actor-critic models in every agent. While actors are parametric generative models
that produce sequences, critics provide a subjective estimation of the expected reward for a given
partial sequence. Agents train a critic using data and later optimize their behavioral strategy (actor)
using the critic’s feedback. After each round, all information is made public, so critics can be trained
using all available experiences including adversaries’ responses.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram describing the agents’ model structure. All encoders and decoders
use gated recurrent units (GRU) [5] and a simple attention mechanism [3]. To simplify notation, we
omit subscript t unless the context is not clear.
Actors Ac agents (c ∈ {red, blue}) use a Seq2Seq model [18] as actor, i.e. an GRU encoder EAc
followed by a GRU decoder DAc that terminates in a softmax. The interrogator I actor has two output
branches: an encoder EAI followed by a decoder DAI or a discriminator CAI . Which output is used
depends on the game step (questioning vs classifying).
Critics Critics follow a similar structure: a GRU encoder EC followed by a feed-forward network
FC that terminates in a softmax function. Given a partial input sequence m1:k = s1· · ·sk, the critic
estimates the corresponding q-value Q(m1:k, sk+1) for every possible sk+1 ∈ Σ. We use a technique
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similar to DQN [15] and vectorize the calculation to obtain a single vector with Q values for each
possible sk+1 ∈ Σ.
EAI
Interrogator I
DAI
FDI
EAcactor AAc DAc
mQt
P (blue|m)
mAimQ
m
ECc FCc QAi(m1:k, sk+1)m1:k
ECI FCI QI(m1:k, sk+1)m1:k
critic ACc
Agents Ac
actor IA
critic IC
actor ID
Figure 1: Agent models
3.1 Learning
In every iteration t, we sample N end-to-end interactions (mQ, cA1 , cA2 ,mA1 ,mA2 , cI1 , c
I
2 ) where
cIi indicates the inferred type with respect to message m
Ai . There are two training stages. We first
train critics and the discriminator using sampled data. Secondly, we train actors using feedback from
their respective critics.
Training with data Samples are used to train both the critics and the discriminator. All critics
(ACc , IC) are trained using concatenated sequences m = mQ||mAi as input. We use binary cross
entropy H(x, y) = − [y · log x+ (1− y) · log(1− x)] and target values η(x) = δcI ,x where δi,j is
the Kronecker delta.
The corresponding losses for each message m and respective known type c are shown in Table 1.
While critics are trained using partial sequences, the discriminator only considers full messages.
Losses are accumulated over all samples and optimization is done using Adam [12].
Table 1: Critics and Discriminator Losses for each sample
LCAc(m, c) LCI (m, c) LDI (m, c)
|m|∑
k=1
H
[
QAc(m:k−1,mk), η(blue)
] |m|∑
k=1
H
[
QI(m:k−1,mk), η(c)
]
H
[
ID(m), η(c)
]
Training with critics We train actors using feedback from their respective critics. We use trigger
messages to obtain a response from actors, i.e. AAc , receives mQ and outputs mAi . We use mQ
messages from previous training samples. For the interrogator, we use fixed empty triggers, actor IA,
receives mT = EOS and outputs mQ. As each symbol mk is generated, we retrieve both the symbol
and the corresponding multinomial distribution pim1:k−1 used by the decoder.
From the respective critic, we obtain a vector Q(m1:k−1, ∗) with q-values for each possible symbol.
The dot product pim1:k−1 ·Q(m1:k−1, ∗) results in the policy expected reward. The sum of the scores
of all samples is later optimized using Adam [12].
4 Experiments
We ran an initial set of experiments where we varied environmental properties or agent capabilities.
All experiments involve continuous learning. Experiment parameters are shown in Table 2.
Within these experiments, it is important to remember that it is in the best interest of agent red not
to reveal its identity. In the games we explore, two kinds of equilibria are expected: separating
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or pooling. In pooling equilibria, the interrogator is not able to extract enough information from
messages to determine sources correctly. Instead, separating equilibria is reached whenever messages
carry enough information for interrogator to effectively determine the source.
Table 2: Experiments
Experiment I Ablue Ared Outcome
1 Identical h = 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 pooling
2 Handicap blue h = 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 6 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 5 separating
3 Handicap red h = 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 5 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 6 pooling
4 Neurons A blue h = 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 h = 4, |mA| ≤ 8 separating
5 Neurons A red h = 8 h = 4, |mA| ≤ 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 pooling
6 Neurons B blue h = 8 h = 16, |mA| ≤ 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 pooling
7 Neurons B red h = 8 h = 8, |mA| ≤ 8 h = 16, |mA| ≤ 8 pooling
h indicates the number of hidden units in the encoder/decoder
We divide experiments in two groups. In the first group (experiments 1 to 3), we disable questioning
by limiting the number of symbols to zero. The second group (experiments 4 to 7) allows for
questioning/priming.
In all games, we impose limitations on the number of Seq2Seq hidden units h and the maximum
amount of symbols an agent can emit before their communication channel is terminated. Agents are
not explicitly aware of these factors but can indirectly perceive them through interaction.
The Identical experiment is a game where all settings and Sc agents are identical. The interrogator
has no chance of differentiating them resulting as expected in a pooling equilibrium. We use this
game to confirm basic behavior.
In Handicap experiments (2 and 3), we assign different length limits to agents. Experiment 2 shows
how blue discovers this advantage to distinguish itself (separating equilibrium). However, when
the advantage is given to red (experiment 3), it is in red best interest to hide this fact and the game
converges to a pooling equilibrium.
The second group of experiments enables questioning. We vary the amount of hidden units in the
encoder/decoders as described in Table 2.
Results of experiment 5 are expected: red does not exploit its advantages and is able to mimic blue
leading to a pooling equilibria. Experiment 4 shows an interesting outcome. The interrogator is able
to separate types, we intuitively expected I to randomize questions, instead both I and blue converge
to fixed sequences. Detailed analysis shows that due the limited amount of hidden units, red is not
able to mimic the constant outputs of blue. Stochastic gradient descent updates affect already learned
responses. This results in unstable outputs that allow I to differentiate between agents. When the
number of hidden units increases (Neurons B (6, 7)), the issue does not occur anymore. For a higher
number of units, we could not detect situations where the interrogator was able to different sources.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we presented a broad class of games inspired on the Imitation game that we relate
to signaling theory. We used these games to explore how communication may arise in adversarial
scenarios. We explored some factors that may enable or hinder separating equilibria. To our
knowledge, this is the first piece of research that explores signaling theory in games that involve
Seq2Seq models. Last but not least, we present a simple operational approach to train ungrounded
Seq2Seq agents in this domain. In future work, we intend to pre-training agents in some known
language such as English. This will allow us to explore a more complex range of experiments by
extending our work to question-answering settings and grounded communication.
4
References
[1] Philip Bachman and Doina Precup. Data Generation as Sequential Decision Making. In C. Cortes, N. D.
Lawrence, D. D. Lee, M. Sugiyama, and R. Garnett, editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 28, pages 3249–3257. Curran Associates, Inc., 2015.
[2] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Philemon Brakel, Kelvin Xu, Anirudh Goyal, Ryan Lowe, Joelle Pineau, Aaron
Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. An Actor-Critic Algorithm for Sequence Prediction. July 2016.
[3] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. Neural Machine Translation by Jointly Learning
to Align and Translate. arXiv:1409.0473 [cs, stat], September 2014.
[4] Kris Cao, Angeliki Lazaridou, Marc Lanctot, Joel Z. Leibo, Karl Tuyls, and Stephen Clark. Emergent
Communication through Negotiation. arXiv:1804.03980 [cs], April 2018.
[5] Kyunghyun Cho, Bart Van Merriënboer, Caglar Gulcehre, Dzmitry Bahdanau, Fethi Bougares, Holger
Schwenk, and Yoshua Bengio. Learning phrase representations using RNN encoder-decoder for statistical
machine translation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.1078, 2014.
[6] Jakob N. Foerster, Yannis M. Assael, Nando de Freitas, and Shimon Whiteson. Learning to Communicate
with Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. arXiv:1605.06676 [cs], May 2016.
[7] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron
Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[8] Alex Graves. Stochastic Backpropagation through Mixture Density Distributions. July 2016.
[9] Serhii Havrylov and Ivan Titov. Emergence of Language with Multi-Agent Games: Learning to Communi-
cate with Sequence of Symbols. In Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Neural Information Processing
Systems (NIPS 2017), December 2017.
[10] Eric Jang, Shixiang Gu, and Ben Poole. Categorical Reparameterization with Gumbel-Softmax.
arXiv:1611.01144 [cs, stat], November 2016.
[11] Anjuli Kannan and Oriol Vinyals. Adversarial Evaluation of Dialogue Models. arXiv:1701.08198 [cs],
January 2017.
[12] Diederik P. Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization. arXiv:1412.6980 [cs],
December 2014.
[13] Matt J. Kusner and José Miguel Hernández-Lobato. GANS for Sequences of Discrete Elements with the
Gumbel-softmax Distribution. arXiv:1611.04051 [cs, stat], November 2016.
[14] Angeliki Lazaridou, Alexander Peysakhovich, and Marco Baroni. Multi-Agent Cooperation and the
Emergence of (Natural) Language. arXiv:1612.07182 [cs], December 2016.
[15] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A. Rusu, Joel Veness, Marc G. Bellemare,
Alex Graves, Martin Riedmiller, Andreas K. Fidjeland, Georg Ostrovski, Stig Petersen, Charles Beattie,
Amir Sadik, Ioannis Antonoglou, Helen King, Dharshan Kumaran, Daan Wierstra, Shane Legg, and
Demis Hassabis. Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518(7540):529–533,
February 2015.
[16] Ayse Pinar Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli, and Varol Akman. Turing Test: 50 Years Later. Minds and Machines,
10(4):463–518, November 2000.
[17] Michael Spence. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3):355–374, 1973.
[18] Ilya Sutskever, Oriol Vinyals, and Quoc V. Le. Sequence to Sequence Learning with Neural Networks.
arXiv:1409.3215 [cs], September 2014.
[19] Yi-Lin Tuan, Jinzhi Zhang, Yujia Li, and Hung-yi Lee. Proximal Policy Optimization and its Dynamic
Version for Sequence Generation. arXiv:1808.07982 [cs, stat], August 2018.
[20] A. M. Turing. Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind, 59(236):433–460, 1950.
[21] Oriol Vinyals and Quoc Le. A Neural Conversational Model. arXiv:1506.05869 [cs], June 2015.
[22] Lantao Yu, Weinan Zhang, Jun Wang, and Yong Yu. SeqGAN: Sequence Generative Adversarial Nets with
Policy Gradient. arXiv:1609.05473 [cs], September 2016.
[23] Amotz Zahavi. Mate selection—A selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53(1):205–214,
September 1975.
5
